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We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and (relative) 
public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-return 
characteristics of the participating countries more similar, so that the substitutability of their 
public debt increases after unification. This implies that the average expected real return on 
the debt increases. Also, the share of the unionwide debt issued by relatively myopic 
governments or of countries that initially have a relatively dependent central bank increases 
after unification. This may put the political sustainability of the union under pressure. A 
transfer scheme that penalizes debt increases beyond the union average is able to undo the 
interest rate effect of unification, but magnifies the spread in relative debt levels. 
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disclaimer applies. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The implications of European Monetary Union (EMU) for public debt and, in particular,
the real returns on public debt, have so far received only rather limited attention.1 Many
economists believe that, even if there are any such implications, these are mainly the
concern of individual EMU participants, because the spillover eﬀects of any policy changes
induced by EMU are uncertain and small (e.g., Buiter et al., 1993). In particular, as many
would argue, to the extent that an individual increase in public debt leads to higher debt-
servicing costs, these additional costs are borne only by the country under consideration
in the form of a higher risk premium in the debt return.
In this paper we demonstrate that this view may not be correct. For this purpose, we
build a simple theoretical model that can be used to analyze the implications of monetary
uniﬁcation for public debt and its costs. The model is purposefully kept as simple as
possible, but has one major novel feature: as we want to analyze the eﬀect of monetary
uniﬁcation on the supply of the public debt, we do not only model the demand side
of the bond market (as is the case in most of the literature), but also its supply side.
Monetary uniﬁcation increases the correlation of the real returns on the public debt of
the member countries by reducing idiosyncratic shocks to national inﬂation rates.2 The
enhanced substitutability of the various member countries’ public debt in the portfolios
of the investors reduces the attractiveness to the latter of holding this debt. As a result,
the expected real interest rate paid on the debt exceeds its pre-uniﬁcation level. Such
a potential increase in debt-servicing costs has also been recognized by the European
Commission (2002, p.156).
Because of indirect eﬀects running via the consumption pattern, the general equilib-
rium implications for the debt level are ambiguous. However, we ﬁnd that the share of
the union area’s debt issued by countries with relatively undisciplined governments or
relatively dependent central banks before uniﬁcation increases after uniﬁcation. We be-
lieve that this is an important implication of the model, because relative debt levels seem
politically more relevant than absolute debt levels, as it is hard for a government to blame
other governments for their ﬁscal laxity when its own debt is high. Because relative debt
levels determine the relative importance of the interest rate externalities that countries
exert on each other, they may become a source of tension in a monetary union. Indeed,
1Van Aarle et al. (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) and Illing (1999) study the implications
of monetary uniﬁcation for public debt, while Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000, 2002) investigate public debt in a monetary union when ﬁscal rules are present. Missale (1999)
provides an extensive discussion of public debt policies in Europe before EMU. Canzoneri and Diba
(1991) and Restoy (1996) analyze real interest rates in a monetary union, while Chang (1990) explores
the international externalities of national ﬁscal policies for the real interest rate. De Grauwe and Polan
(2001) provide an informal discussion of a.o. the implications of EMU for interest rate spillovers. Finally,
for empirical work on the relation between public debt and real interest rates, see e.g. Ford and Laxton
(1999).
2Evidence of reductions in yield spreads and increasedb o n dr e t u r nc o r r e l a t i o n si nE u r o p ea f t e rm o n e -
tary uniﬁcation can be found in Capiello et al. (2003), Baele et al. (2004) and Pagano and Von Thadden
(2004).
1in our model, a debt increase in one country exerts a direct positive eﬀect on the required
rate of return on other countries’ debt when these countries all form a monetary union,
while this eﬀect is absent when the countries do not form a union. Hence, monetary
uniﬁcation may cause worries in low-debt countries about the ﬁscal discipline of highly-
indebted countries. This may put pressure on the political sustainability of the monetary
union. A ﬁscal transfer scheme conditional on public debt forces individual governments
to internalize the interest rate externalities of their own debt policies. We show that such
a scheme restores the before-uniﬁcation average real borrowing cost. However, the scheme
magniﬁes the spread in relative debt levels.
We emphasize that our analysis is positive and designed to highlight the mechanisms
that may lead to the results described above. Hence, we refrain from analyzing the welfare
consequences of monetary uniﬁcation or of adopting a ﬁscal transfer scheme. That would
require a more complicated modelling setup, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
This section also derives the outcomes of the model under national monetary policymaking
and a monetary union. Section 3 discusses the main results. Section 4 explores a simple
transfer scheme that induces governments to internalize the interest rate externalities
caused by their debt policies. In Section 5, we explore a variation on basic set-up of the
model. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Set-up
We consider a world with N>1 countries. The countries 1,..,Nu,w i t h2 ≤ Nu ≤ N,
may form a monetary union, and we will compare the situation before and after monetary
uniﬁcation. The monetary union and its size are exogenous. In other words, we do not
study the incentives for countries to participate in a monetary union.3 This enables us to
focus on the issues at hand, namely the implications of monetary uniﬁcation for public
borrowing costs and relative debt levels. Moreover, in reality, monetary uniﬁcation is often
as much a political project as it is a project based on purely economic arguments. It is
often argued that this is also the case for EMU.
The demographic structure consists of overlapping generations of a constant size. The
countries are of equal size, with the size of a generation in a country normalized to 1.
3The factors that determine the desirability of monetary uniﬁcation were ﬁrst explored by Mundell
(1961). He emphasizes the role of transactions costs and labor mobility. Recent work has investigated the
issue from a variety of other perspectives. For example, Neumeyer (1998) ﬁnds that the welfare eﬀects
of a monetary union depend on the trade-oﬀ between eliminating exchange rate ﬂuctuations unrelated
to economic shocks and reducing hedging possibilities (by reducing the number of currencies); Calmfors
(2001) shows that uniﬁcation alters the incentives for structural (labor market) reform; Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998) demonstrate that uniﬁcation may change the strategic interactions among the ﬁscal
and monetary policymakers in a beneﬁcial way; and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) study the consequences
of a monetary union for trade union behavior.
2Each generation lives for two periods and is represented by a representative agent per
country. We adopt this simple overlapping generations structure, because it allows for a
straightforward derivation of a simple demand function for public debt by private agents,
thereby also allowing for explicit solutions of the model (see below).
In the sequel of this subsection, we describe the behavior of the representative agents,
the governments and the central banks in the diﬀerent countries. In the next subsection, we
will solve the model and consider separately the case before and after monetary uniﬁcation.
2.1.1 The representative agents
Consider the representative agent born in country i in period t.I n t h e ﬁrst period of
her life, she receives an exogenous endowment Y ,p a y st a x e sTi,t, consumes part of her
after-tax endowment, and saves the remainder for the second period of her life. In the
second period of her life, she is retired and consumes her gross savings. The agent can
save by holding public debt of each of the N countries, or by investing in a production
technology that yields an exogenously determined risk-free real rate of return r∗ ≥ 0.4





























2,t+1 are her consumption in periods t and t +1 , respectively, while ωi
j,t




j,t is the share of her savings invested in the risk-free technology) and rj,t+1 is
the (ex-post) real interest rate paid in period t +1on the debt issued in period t.T h e
shares ωi
j,t will be derived endogenously below from the agent’s optimization problem.

























,w i t h γ>0,( 2 )
where ρ is the agent’s discount rate and Et [.] is the expectations operator conditional
on the available information in period t (see below). In what follows, we will assume for
simplicity that the risk-free interest rate r∗ is equal to the discount rate ρ.W ea l s oa s s u m e
that γ is such that the marginal utility of consumption is always positive in the situations
that are relevant for the ensuing analyis.
2.1.2 The governments
Each country i has a government (called “government i”) which spends an exogenously
determined amount Gi,t in period t. The assumption that spending is exogenous is in line
4Thus, an agent born in period t foregoes consumption in that period by investing in this technology.
H o w e v e r ,f o re a c hu n i ti n v e s t e di np e r i o dt, she receives with certainty 1+r∗ units back for consumption
in period t +1 .
3with most of the literature and enhances the focus of the analysis on the issues raised in
the Introduction. Government i ﬁnances its spending by raising taxes and issuing public
debt with a maturity of one period. Hence, its dynamic budget constraint for period t can
be written as:
Bi,t = Gi,t + Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t) − Ti,t, (3)
where Bi,t is the amount of public debt issued in period t, while Bi,t−1 is the debt carried
over from period t − 1 and to be paid oﬀ in period t. Public debt is issued at a nominal
interest rate, such that the ex-post real interest rate ri,t equals this nominal interest rate
minus the realized inﬂation rate.
Subject to (3), the government has to make a trade-oﬀ in period t between higher taxes
or issuing more public debt. On the one hand, higher taxes in period t lower the lifetime
utility of the generation that has to pay the taxes in that period. On the other hand,
higher public debt leads to higher taxes in the future, and lowers the lifetime utility of
the generations that have to pay taxes then. The resulting trade-oﬀ between the interests
of the various generations can be captured with the following simple loss function for
government i in period t:
L
gov
i,t = Ti,t +
1
1+βi
Et [Bi,t(1 + ri,t+1)],w i t h βi > 0.( 4 )
While this loss function is not microfounded, the trade-oﬀ that it embodies is an important
aspect of the policy decisions made in reality. Parameter βi captures the relative impor-
tance that government i attaches to the interests of the current tax payers. Hence, we
refer to this parameter as the degree of myopia of this government. Government myopia
may diﬀer across countries. In reality, such diﬀerences will be related to political factors,
such as political polarization and the government turnover rate.5 The expected future
debt burden also includes the real interest that government i has to pay at that time. As
public debt is issued at a nominal interest rate, uncertainty about the inﬂation rate in
country i between periods t and t +1causes uncertainty about the ex-post real interest
rate ri,t+1 (see below). As a result, when viewed from period t, the real value of the debt
burden in period t +1is uncertain.
2.1.3 The central banks
Before monetary uniﬁcation takes place, each country i has its own central bank. In
period t, the central bank determines the growth rate of the money supply from period t
to period t+1, which we denote by mi,t+1. Money is held by the representative individual
in order to make transactions. In reality, for modern economies such as those of the Euro
5One would expect governments to discount the future at a higher rate when preferences of political
parties diﬀer more or when the government has a higher chance of losing oﬃce. In both cases, there
is a stronger incentive to spend more now, because any remaining resources might be spent by another
government with potentially diﬀerent preferences. Cukierman et al. (1992) in their model derive the
government’s “eﬀective” discount rate as an explicit function of the political factors mentioned here.
4area, seigniorage as a fraction of GDP is very small. In order to focus our attention on the
issues as stake, we ignore seigniorage. Alternatively, we could assume that the central bank
hands the seigniorage directly back to private agents, in which case all budget constraints
are unaltered and the model solution is exactly as described below.
The growth rate of the money supply determines the inﬂation rate, but the link between
money growth and inﬂation is stochastic and given by:
πi,t+1 = mi,t+1 (1 + εi,t+1), (5)
where πi,t+1 is the inﬂation rate in country i between periods t and t +1 ,a n dεi,t+1 is a
stochastic shock with mean zero, variance σ2 and which is i.i.d. over time (at all lags) and
across countries. There are many reasons why a central bank has imperfect control over
the inﬂation rate. For instance, there may be velocity shocks or the link between the base
money supply and higher aggregation levels of the money supply (which are more closely
linked to inﬂation) may be aﬀected by unforeseen events in the commercial banking sector.
Because debt is issued at a nominal interest rate, using a standard linearization, the





i,t+1 − πi,t+1. (6)
Here, and in the sequel, we use a superscript “e” as short-hand notation for Et [.].F u r t h e r ,
re
i,t+1 + πe
i,t+1 is the nominal interest rate, which contains a component to compensate
investors for the expected inﬂation incurred over the lifetime of the debt. We assume that
international trade takes place without any barriers and that each individual, wherever
she resides, consumes the same good or bundle of goods. The nominal exchange rate will
then adjust perfectly and instantaneously to compensate for diﬀerences in inﬂation rates,
thereby preventing arbitrage in goods trade. In particular, the nominal exchange rate
moves to oﬀset unexpected movements in relative inﬂation rates caused by the ε-shocks.
As a result, the real return on a given country’s debt is the same for any investor, no
matter in which country she is residing.
While the inﬂation expectation πe
i,t+1 is on average the correct prediction for the in-
ﬂation rate, actual inﬂation generally diﬀers from its expectation because of its stochastic
link with the money growth rate. In this model, inﬂation uncertainty is the only source
of uncertainty in the returns on public debt. In reality, uncertainty in public debt returns
can be caused by other factors as well, such as occasional default or ﬂuctuations in (the
perception of) default risk.6 We abstract from these other sources of randomness in the
debt returns, because they would complicate the formal analysis, while distracting the
attention from the main results discussed below. Whatever the source of uncertainty, as
we point out in the sequel, the key issue is how the correlations of the debt returns change
with monetary uniﬁcation. As we shall argue, the correlation of inﬂation rates will tend
6For an empirical analysis of default risk premia on Euro-area public debt, see Bernoth et al. (2003);
see also Arnold and Lemmen (2001).
5to increase among countries that form a monetary union, thereby contributing to higher
correlations of the debt returns.
The primary objective of the central bank is to maintain price stability, that is, to
stabilize the inﬂation rate around zero. However, the central bank also cares about the
public debt that the government has to repay (possibly because of pressure from the ﬁscal
authorities), and therefore has an incentive to create surprise inﬂation, thereby driving
down the ex-post real debt return (6). Let us model this trade-oﬀ by assuming that the





2 + λiEt [Bi,t (1 + ri,t+1)],w i t h λi > 0. (7)
One can interpret the parameter λi as a measure of the central bank’s dependence on the
goverment. The higher is λi, the more dependent is the central bank, because it has a
larger interest in softening the budgetary situation of the government, as measured by
Bi,t.
When the countries 1,.., Nu form a monetary union, their central banks are replaced
by a common central bank for the whole union. This common central bank determines
mu
t+1, the common nominal money growth rate in each country of the union. This, in
turn, determines πu
t+1,t h ec o m m o ni n ﬂation rate throughout the union. The relation be-
tween mu
t+1 and πu
t+1 is as in equation (5), where the stochastic shocks are now perfectly
correlated among the countries that participate in the monetary union, but are still inde-
pendent otherwise. The other properties of the shocks (in particular, their variances) are
unaﬀected. Although this may come as a rather strong assumption, it is a priori not clear
how monetary uniﬁcation aﬀects the degree to which a central bank is able to control the
inﬂation rate. Hence, to avoid complicating the analysis with too many changes at the
same time, we assume that the variance of the shock that links the money growth rate
with the inﬂation rate is not aﬀe c t e db ym o n e t a r yu n i ﬁcation.
The assumption of perfectly correlated ε- s h o c k sa c r o s st h eu n i o nm e m b e r si sm a d e
purely for expositional convenience. Our results would be completely identical if we
dropped this assumption and focussed directly on the stochastic properties of the inﬂation
rates. As we will see below, all that matters are the correlations of inﬂation before and
after monetary uniﬁcation, because this determines the correlations of the real debt re-
turns.7 In the absence of trade barriers, national inﬂation rates will be perfectly correlated
in a union, irrespective of the correlation in the ε-shocks of union members. Diﬀerences in
these shocks would simply be oﬀset by diﬀerences in the growth rates of national holdings
of the union-wide currency. It is then the union-wide money growth rate that determines
the common inﬂation rate.
The loss function of the common central bank now depends on the union-wide inﬂation
rate πu
t+1 and on the average real public debt burden which the diﬀerent governments in
7Note that nominal bond yields in the various member countries of EMU (except for Greece) have
become virtually identical since 1998 (see European Commission, 2002, p.157). So the only remaining
source of cross-country diﬀerences in real bond returns are cross-country diﬀerences in inﬂation rates.
















Bi,t (1 + ri,t+1)
#
,w i t h λ
u > 0.( 8 )
Equation (5) implies that higher money growth, and therefore also higher expected
inﬂation, goes hand in hand with a higher variance of inﬂation. Furthermore, as inﬂation
uncertainty is the only source of uncertainty in the real debt returns, the variance of the









¢2 σ2 i nt h ec a s eo fm o n e t a r yu n i ﬁcation. Given
that inﬂation is perfectly correlated across countries if they both participate in the mone-
tary union but independent across countries otherwise, we have the following expressions
for the covariances between the real debt returns:






2, if i and j both
participate in a monetary union,
Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=Covt (πi,t+1,πj,t+1)=0 , otherwise. (10)
2.1.4 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that:
NY +( 1+r








2,t is the aggregate consumption of all old agents, Gt ≡
PN
i=1 Gi,t is ag-















aggregate investment in the risk-free rate technology. Hence, (11) says that aggregate pro-
duction plus the gross return on the previous period’s risk-free investment equals aggregate
expenditure.











i,t,f o r a l l i. (12)
8While the European Central Bank (ECB) is supposed to be completely independent from governments
according to the Maastricht Treaty, in reality, there are many ways in which politicians can exert some
inﬂuence on the ECB’s policies. One possibility is through the appointment of the national Euro-area
central bank presidents or the members of the ECB’s Executive Board. These two groups together form
the Governing Council which decides on the monetary policy stance in the Euro-area. Also, policymakers
have repeatedly made public calls on the ECB to relax its policy stance. Overall, the assumption that
λ
u > 0 s e e m st ob ear e a l i s t i co n ei nt h ec a s eo ft h eE C B .
72.2 Solution of the model
The timing within an arbitrary period t is as follows. First, each government selects its
public debt level. Simultaneously, conditional expectations Et [.] are formed and private
sector agents take their investment decisions. In selecting its public debt, each government
takes into account the private sector’s demand schedule for its public debt, but takes as
given the other governments’ debt choices, as well as monetary policy. Next, the central
bank of country i chooses mi,t+1,i fi does not participate in a monetary union, and the
union central bank — if a union is formed — selects the common money growth rate mu
t+1.
Finally, the shocks εi,t+1 materialize. This determines the realized inﬂation rate and the
realized rate of return on the various countries’ public debt. Hence, εi,t+1 is not included
in the information set on which the conditional expectation Et [.] is based.
We ﬁrst derive the representative agents’ demand for public debt. Then, we derive the
solutions to the problems faced by the governments and the central banks.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the representative young agent in country i with respect





















Substitute the budget constraint (1) into (13) and work out the argument of the expecta-


































Aggregating across the representative agents of the diﬀerent countries, taking into account
the equilibrium conditions (12) and using the assumption that r∗ = ρ,w eo b t a i nt h e
following “mean-variance”-expression for the demand for country i’s debt as a function of
















1 − γ ¯ C1,t
¢. (15)
Here, ¯ C1,t = C1,t/N is the average consumption of the representative agents of the young
generation across the diﬀerent countries, so that 1 − γ ¯ C1,t is the average marginal utility
of consumption across agents.
8The problem of government i amounts to the minimization of its loss function (4),
subject to its budget constraint (3) and expression (15), taking the public debt of the
other countries and monetary policy (and, thus, the (co)variances of the returns) as given.
This yields the following expression for the supply of country i’s debt a saf u n c t i o no fi t s
expected real interest rate:
r
e
i,t+1 = βi − µtBi,tVart (ri,t+1). (16)
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Government i issues debt until the real
interest rate which it expects to pay on its public debt equals its myopia βi minus at e r m
that takes into account that a marginal increase of its indebtedness drives up the interest
rate and, therefore, makes all of its outstanding debt more expensive. In the following, we
shall conﬁne the analysis to the case of βi >r e
i,t+1(such that Bi,t > 0) for all countries i.
We shall now consider the central banks’ optimization problem. To this end, we shall
distinguish the situation before and after monetary uniﬁcation.
2.2.1 Solution without a monetary union
In the absence of a monetary union each country has its own central bank. The problem
of the central bank of country i is then to choose the money growth rate mi,t+1 such that
it minimizes its loss function (7), subject to equation (5) and taking the country’s public
debt level Bi,t and the expected values re
i,t+1 and πe






Hence, the money growth rate is increasing in the amount of debt and the degree of central
bank dependence, λi.







2 ≡ ˜ σ
2
i, (18)
Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 , for all j 6= i. (19)
Substitute these expressions into equations (15) and (16), equate the resulting right-hand






















where the superscript “nu” refers to the case of no union. For future use, we derive the
public debt level of country i ∈ {1,..,Nu} relative to the average public debt for this




























i,t denotes the relative public debt level and ¯ Bnu
t the average level. Finally, the








2.2.2 Solution with a monetary union
L e tu sn o wc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ec o u n t r i e s1,..,Nu form a monetary union. The
problem of the common central bank is to choose the union-wide money growth rate mu
t+1
such that its loss function (8) is minimized subject to equation (5), taking as given all
debt levels as well as the expected values re
i,t+1 and π
e,u











1+σ2, for all countries i






i,t is the average debt level in the union’s member countries. The









2 ≡ ˆ σ
2, for all countries i (24)
that participate in the union,
Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=ˆ σ
2, if countries i and j both
participate in the union,
=0 , otherwise. (25)





















where the superscript “u”i nµu
t and Bu
it refers to the case of a monetary union. Take the
union average of (27):
r
e






where ¯ β = 1
Nu
PNu
i=1 βi is the average value of βi across the union members. Combining








¯ β − r∗
1+Nu.






























=1 + ( 1 + N
u)
βi − ¯ β
¯ β − r∗, (30)
which we obtain by combining (26), (27) and (28). Finally, the equilibrium expected real











The expected debt returns and the public debt levels of the countries not in the union are
still given by (23) and (22), respectively, with µnu
t replaced by µu
t.
3T h e e ﬀect of a monetary union on debt returns and
public debt
In this section we analyze how monetary uniﬁcation aﬀects the relative debt levels and
the returns on the public debt of the union’s members.
Let us ﬁrst consider the expected real debt returns. In the derivation of equations
(23) and (31) the variance of the real return (˜ σ2, respectively ˆ σ
2) drops out and, thus,
in equilibrium does not aﬀect the expected real return. The reason for this is as follows.
A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 1 5 ) ,t h eh i g h e rt h ev a r i a n c eV a r t (ri,t+1), the less public debt
investors are willing to hold in their portfolio for a given expected rate of return. However,
according to equation (16), the higher Vart (ri,t+1), the less public debt the government
will want to supply for a given expected rate of return (because the more the interest rate
will rise and the more expensive the outstanding debt will become when the government
tries to supply an extra unit of public debt). As a result, any change in the demand for
debt due to a change in Vart (ri,t+1) will be accompanied by a change in the supply of
debt of equal magnitude. This implies that in equilibrium, a change in Vart (ri,t+1) only
aﬀects the level of the public debt, but not its expected rate of return.9 T h i sl e a d su st o
Proposition 1, which follows immediately from the preceding discussion:
9Intuitively, one expects the main message here to survive extensions of the current model: generally,
for a given expected rate of return, a higher return variance will reduce both the demand for and the
11Proposition 1 In equilibrium, uncertainty about the inﬂation rate does not aﬀect the
expected real debt returns. Consequently, whether inﬂation becomes more or less predictable
when countries form a monetary union, does not matter for the expected real debt returns.
However, when countries form a monetary union, the returns on their public debt
become perfectly correlated with each other. As a result, holding public debt of these
countries increases the risk of the investors’ overall portfolio, even when the variance of
the debt returns does not change. Individuals will therefore demand a higher risk premium,
which drives up the average expected rate of return. This yields Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 (a) The average expected real return on the public debt of the potential
union members increases as a result of monetary uniﬁcation. (b) Given that countries
form a monetary union, the average expected real return on their public debt is increasing
in the union size.
Proof. (a) The average expected real rate of return on the public debt of countries










¡¯ β + r
∗¢
.
Equation (31) immediately yields the (average) expected real rate of return r
e,u
t+1 when
the countries do form a monetary union. As we assume throughout the analysis that
Bi,t > 0 for all countries i, it follows from equation (29) that ¯ β>r ∗.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
Nu
1+Nu ¯ β + 1
1+Nur∗ > 1
2
¡¯ β + r∗¢








(b) Immediate from (31) and the fact that ¯ β>r ∗.
While the average expected real return increases as a result of monetary uniﬁcation,
some countries may actually experience a fall in the expected real return on their debt, as
a result of the fact that the expected returns on the participants’ debt have converged to
the same level. This will be the case for countries with a government that is suﬃciently
myopic relative to the other governments. All other governments will face an increase in
the expected cost of issuing public debt.
To see the intuition for part (b) of Proposition 2, observe that an increase in the
number of union members means that a larger amount of perfectly substitutable debt is
issued. Hence, for investors to be willing to buy this debt, the required expected return
must be higher for any given level of ¯ Bu
t . T h i si sc a p t u r e db yt h et e r mNu in (26). In
addition, the return variance, ˆ σ
2, rises because of the increase in ¯ Bu
t . This further raises
the required expected return for any given level of ¯ Bu
t . However, in equilibrium, this eﬀect
supply of debt. These eﬀects work in opposite directions, so that the change in the equilibrium real rate
of return may be relatively small. This underlines the importance of explicitly modelling not only the
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Figure 1:
is oﬀset by the fall in the supply of debt resulting from the higher return variance — see
(28). Figure 1 depicts (26) and (28) as functions of ¯ Bu
t .A n i n c r e a s e i n Nu means that
(26) becomes steeper and, hence, the equilibrium expected return rises.
Now, we further analyze the outcomes for public debt. Equation (21) shows that
Bnu
i,t depends on µnu
t . Similarly, Bu
i,t depends on µu
t. In turn, the values of µnu
t and µu
t
are functions of the consumption of young agents without and with a monetary union,
respectively, while consumption itself is determined jointly with the public debt levels.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist a closed-form solution for consumption and
the public debt levels. This prevents us from formally comparing the public debt levels
before and after monetary uniﬁcation.
However, we can circumvent this problem by looking at relative debt levels. These
also seem politically more relevant, as it is diﬃcult for a high-debt government to blame
other governments for their indebtedness. Relative debt levels can become a much bigger
source of tension in a monetary union, because they may lead to diﬀerences in the poten-
tial externalities that countries exert on each other. Here, the relevant externality is the
eﬀect of a country’s debt on another country’s expected real debt return. Equation (15)
13shows that the direct eﬀect of country j’s debt on country i’s required real debt return is
µtBj,tCovt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1). While in the absence of monetary uniﬁcation, this direct eﬀect is
zero because Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 ,t h ee ﬀect is positive when the two countries partici-
pate in a union. The relative size of this eﬀect that the two countries exert on each other
is the inverse of the ratio of their debt levels, Bj,t/Bi,t. The increased importance of the
externality just described may help to explain why European countries have become more
concerned about each other’s ﬁscal discipline since EMU became a realistic prospect.
We are now ready to present Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 (a) If country i’s government (i =1 ,..,Nu) before monetary uniﬁcation
is suﬃciently myopic compared to the governments of the other prospective members, then
i’s relative public debt level will increase after uniﬁcation. (b) For countries that already
form a union, the relative public debt level is increasing (decreasing) in the union size Nu
if βi > ¯ β (βi < ¯ β).
Proof. (a) From equations (22) and (30) it follows that the relative public debt level
of country i increases after monetary uniﬁcation if and only if
1+( 1+N
u)
βi − ¯ β


































As we assume throughout the analysis that Bi,t > 0 for all countries i, equation (30)
implies that the left-hand-side of the inequality above is always positive. If βi goes to
∞ (holding βj (j 6= i) ﬁxed), then the left-hand-side of this inequality converges to 1+
(1 + Nu)(Nu − 1), while the right-hand-side converges to Nu. Hence, the inequality will
hold if government i is suﬃciently myopic relative to the other governments.
(b) Immediate from (30).
We can explain part (a) of Proposition 3 as follows. A country with a relatively myopic
government will tend to have a relatively high public debt level for a given variance of
real debt returns — see (21). Suppose ﬁrst that this country has its own central bank.
The relatively high public debt level will induce the central bank to try to create surprise
inﬂation, which leads to a high money growth rate in equilibrium — see (17). This, in
turn, causes high inﬂation uncertainty, and therefore also a high variance of the real debt
returns. This adverse implication of issuing a relatively large amount of debt induces
the government to limit its public debt somewhat. Suppose now that the country joins
a monetary union, so that its central bank is replaced by a union-wide central bank.
This union-wide central bank takes into account the public debt levels of all its member
countries when deciding to what extent it will try to create inﬂation. It will, therefore,
14be less tempted to try to create high inﬂation and maintain a high money growth rate in
response to the relatively high public debt level in an individual member country. However,
if the money growth rate decreases in a country with a relatively high public debt level
when it joins a monetary union, the inﬂation uncertainty, and therefore also the variance
of real debt returns, will decrease as well. As a result, the mitigating feedback-eﬀect
on the public debt decision of the government will weaken, and the government will feel
less restrained to issue debt. So, the indebtedness of a country with a relatively myopic
government will increase after monetary uniﬁcation compared to the average indebtedness
in the union’s member countries. Vice versa for a country with a government characterized
by a relatively low degree of myopia.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 can be understood as follows. First, recall that the expected
real debt return is increasing in the number of member countries of the monetary union (see
Proposition 2(b)). Now, note from equation (27) that each member country will reduce its
public debt by the same amount when the expected real debt return rises. Hence, when
the union expands, countries with a relatively forward-looking government that already
start with a relatively low debt level will decrease their public debt in absolute terms as
much as countries with a relatively myopic government that start with a relatively high
public debt level. As a result, when union expands, countries with a relatively myopic
government will face an increase of their relative indebtedness compared with the average
indebtedness in the union.
Now, we turn to the ﬁnal result of this section, and establish:
Proposition 4 If the central bank of a country before monetary uniﬁcation is suﬃciently
dependent relative to the central banks of the other prospective members, then the relative
public debt level of the country increases after monetary uniﬁcation (i.e., bu
i,t >b nu
i,t).
Proof. Observe that the right-hand of (32) converges to 0 when λi goes to inﬁnity
(holding λj (j 6= i) ﬁxed). Hence, (32) holds if the central bank of country i is suﬃciently
dependent relative to the other central banks.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. For a given level of public debt,
a country with a relatively dependent central bank (compared to the other prospective
members of the monetary union) will have a relatively strong desire to create surprise
inﬂation, and therefore in equilibrium a relatively high money growth rate. As explained
above, the prospect of a high money growth rate has a mitigating eﬀect on the amount of
debt issued by the goverment. So, governments of countries with a relatively dependent
central bank will have a relatively strong incentive to limit their public debt levels. How-
ever, in a monetary union, all governments face the same money growth rate. As a result,
the relative public debt of countries that experience a relatively high money growth rate
under monetary independence, will increase once they join the union.
154 A simple transfer scheme to avoid the interest rate
hike
In the previous section, we showed that the average expected real debt return increases
in our model when countries form a monetary union. In fact, this is due to a pecuniary
externality that the governments of the individual countries do not internalize when they
decide how much debt to supply. As equation (15) shows, the externality arises, because
monetary uniﬁcation raises the correlation of the returns on the public debt issued by
the member countries. The question thus arises whether it is somehow possible to induce
governments to internalize the interest rate externalities from the changes in public debt
policies caused by monetary uniﬁcation.
It turns out that the upward pressure on the expected real debt return can be oﬀset
with a simple transfer scheme that transfers resources to or from other countries when a
country’s public debt deviates from the average public debt level of the union members.
Such a transfer scheme has some resemblance to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
which is also intended to discipline proﬂigate governments. However, the SGP imposes
sanctions for deﬁcit/GDP ratios that exceed the 3% level,10 while the transfer scheme
proposed here is eﬀectively based on relative public debt levels.11 Hence, with the transfer
scheme the budget constraint of the government of country i becomes:
Bi,t = Gi + Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t)+τ
¡








Bi,t − ¯ Bu
t
¢
is the transfer, with τ a constant which will be chosen in such a
way that the average expected interest rate is restored to the pre-monetary union level.
Observe that the transfer scheme is budgetarily neutral at the union level, because the
s u mo ft h et r a n s f e r sa c r o s sa l lc o u n t r i e si sz e r o .
The demand for country i’s debt as a function of its expected real interest rate, equation
(15), remains unchanged. However, the supply of country i’s debt as a function of its
expected real interest rate is now found by minimizing the loss function (4), subject to
equations (15) and (33):
r
e





(1 + βi). (34)
By substituting (24) and (25) into equations (15) and (34) one can then solve for the
10For analyses of the SGP and closely related schemes, see e.g. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Beetsma
and Bovenberg (2001), Debrun (2001), Dixit (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). More informal discussions
of the Pact and its consequences can be found in Artis and Winkler (1998), Brunila et al. (2001) and
Uhlig (2002).
11It is probably fair to say that relative deﬁcit levels play a major role in the operation of the SGP. The
reason is that the initiation of the so-called Excessive Deﬁcit procedure and the ensuing sanctions are
decided upon by qualiﬁed majority vote in the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN)
of the EU. Hence, fear of “retaliation” may prevent countries with high deﬁcits to vote for imposing
sanctions on other countries.



















which is, of course, constant across countries. The value of τ that restores the pre-
uniﬁcation expected average real interest rate for the region follows upon equating (35)
to the union average of (23), 1
2
¡¯ β + r∗¢









Hence, the transfer scheme results in payments from member countries with a higher-
than-average public debt to member countries with a lower-than-average public debt. The
amount that a member country pays or receives is proportional to the diﬀerence between
its own debt level and the average debt level across the union members. Note also that
the proportionality factor is an increasing function of ¯ β, the average degree of myopia of
the union governments.
Now, substitute (36) for τ, 1
2
¡¯ β + r∗¢
for re
i,t+1 and (24) for Vart (ri,t+1) into (34).































The ﬁnal term in the curly brackets of this expression arises from the presence of the
transfer scheme, which provides an incentive to government i to reduce its public debt.

















t constant, the average debt level falls compared to the situation without the
transfer scheme. This is not surprising, given that the transfer scheme makes it more
costly for governments to issue debt.
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Now, compare (38) with (30). It is easy to check that the transfer scheme implies a rise
(fall) in the relative debt level iﬀ βi > (<) ¯ β. The fall in the average debt level induced by
t h et r a n s f e rs c h e m e“ b l o w su p ”t h er e l a t i v ed e b tl e v e l s ,d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tt h es c h e m e
provides a more myopic government with a stronger incentive to reduce its debt — see (37).
Hence, with the proposed scheme, the least disciplined governments issue an even larger
share of the union’s debt.
We can now summarize the results of this section in the following proposition:
17Proposition 5 We have that (a) a linear transfer scheme which depends on the diﬀerence
between the individual and average union debt is able to restore the pre-uniﬁcation average
expected debt return and (b) the dispersion in relative debt levels increases further with the
introduction of this transfer scheme.
5 Variation: a quadratic government objective func-
tion
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results for an alternative government
objective function. The government now trades oﬀ ﬂuctuations in the tax burden of the
current young against ﬂuctuations in the future tax burden, as captured by debt burden






















To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that the economy is in its long run
non-stochastic equilibrium. In other words, we consider the case in which shocks happen
to be absent (though there is uncertainty, so that risk premia are still present) and public
debt remains constant over time. The Appendix (available upon request) shows that the










b ≡ (1 + βi)Bi,t − B
2
i,tµtVart (ri,t+1).






















The system (40) (i =1 ,..,N), (15) (i =1 ,..,N), (41) and (42) is solved for the general
equilibrium outcomes of Bj,t (i =1 ,..,N), re
j,t+1 (i =1 ,..,N), It and ¯ C1,t.W e s o l v e t h e
system numerically and adopt the following procedure. We assume a world consisting of
10 countries (or groups of countries), each with a normalized GDP of Y =1 .T w oo ft h e s e
countries potentially form a monetary union. Such a monetary union makes up 20% of
the world economy, which is roughly the size of EMU in the world economy. Government
consumption G is 20% of GDP. In Table 1a, we assume that r∗ =0 .80, while βi is either
181 (“low”) or 1.5 (“high”). Assuming that one period in the model is thirty years, r∗
corresponds to a risk-free rate of approximately 2% at the yearly level, a number that
is not far from the average realized real interest rate over the past decades. We assume
further that Vart (ri,t+1) = 100 ∗ (0.02)
2, a number that corresponds roughly to a 2%
standard deviation of the yearly asset return if the returns are independent over time (see
the Appendix — available upon request).
Table 1a: Numerical results for a risk-free interest rate of approx. 2% at yearly level
Case B1,t B2,t B3,t,..,BN,t r1,t+1 r2,t+1 r3,t+1,..,rN,t+1 B2,t/B1,t ¯ C1,t
1 0.23734 0.23734 0.23734 0.80156 0.80156 0.80156 1 0.39212
2 0.23735 0.38840 0.23735 0.80154 0.80252 0.80154 1.63638 0.38433
3 0.23699 0.23699 0.21978 0.80312 0.80312 0.80156 1 0.39213
4 0.23679 0.38789 0.23735 0.80409 0.80406 0.80154 1.63814 0.38435
5 0.23577 0.23577 0.23577 0.80854 0.80854 0.80854 1 0.39246
6 0.23569 0.38611 0.23569 0.80892 0.80940 0.80892 1.63817 0.38469
7 0.23560 0.23560 0.23577 0.80931 0.80931 0.80854 1 0.39246
8 0.23541 0.38585 0.23569 0.81017 0.81017 0.80891 1.63905 0.38470
Note: (only) countries 1 and 2 potentially form a union. When the government discount
rates are equal, then β1 = ... = βN =1 . When they are not equal, then
β1 = β3 = ... = βN =1 , while β2 =1 .5. We consider the following cases. Case 1:
monetary autonomy and equal β’s, while all returns are uncorrelated between countries
at all leads and lags. Case 2: as Case 1, but with diﬀerent β’s. Case 3: monetary union
with equal β’s and perfect return correlations between union countries, while all other
returns are uncorrelated. Case 4: as Case 3, but with diﬀerent β’s. Case 5:m o n e t a r y
autonomy and equal β’s, but with returns correlated such that
Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 .5∗Vart (ri,t+1),i6= j. Case 6:a sC a s e5 ,b u tw i t hd i ﬀerent β’s.
Case 7: monetary union with equal β’s and perfect return correlations between union
countries, while all other covariances are given by Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 .5∗Vart (ri,t+1).
Case 8: as Case 7, but with diﬀerent β’s.
We also consider a higher risk-free interest rate. For this case, we assume that r∗ =
2.20, which corresponds to a risk-free rate of approximately 4% at the yearly level, and
set βi either at 2.5 (“low”) or 3 (“high”). Further, Vart (ri,t+1)=3 0 0∗ (0.04)
2,w h i c h
corresponds roughly to a 4% standard deviation of the yearly asset return (again assuming
that the returns are independent over time — see the Appendix, which is available upon
request). These results are presented in Table 1b.
19Table 1b: Numerical results for a risk-free interest rate of approx. 4% at yearly level
Case B1,t B2,t B3,t,..,BN,t r1,t+1 r2,t+1 r3,t+1,..,rN,t+1 B2,t/B1,t ¯ C1,t
9 0.22536 0.22536 0.22536 2.21405 2.21405 2.21405 1 0.23011
10 0.22558 0.38979 0.22558 2.21357 2.22344 2.21357 1.72795 0.20196
11 0.22250 0.22250 0.22536 2.22777 2.22777 2.21406 1 0.23077
12 0.22082 0.38395 0.22557 2.23643 2.23643 2.21359 1.73875 0.20324
13 0.21305 0.21305 0.21305 2.27441 2.27441 2.27441 1 0.24411
14 0.21273 0.36445 0.21273 2.27650 2.28116 2.27650 1.71340 0.21828
15 0.21175 0.21175 0.21306 2.28104 2.28104 2.27436 1 0.24440
16 0.21060 0.36188 0.21275 2.28747 2.28747 2.27642 1.71834 0.21885
Note: (only) countries 1 and 2 potentially form a union. When the government discount
rates are equal, then β1 = ... = βN =2 .5. When they are not equal, then
β1 = β3 = ... = βN =2 .5, while β2 =3 . We consider the following cases. Case 9:
monetary autonomy and equal β’s, while all returns are uncorrelated between countries
at all leads and lags. Case 10: as Case 9, but with diﬀerent β’s. Case 11: monetary
union with equal β’s and perfect return correlations between union countries, while all
other returns are uncorrelated. Case 12: as Case 11, but with diﬀerent β’s. Case 13:
monetary autonomy and equal β’s, but with returns correlated such that
Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 .5∗Vart (ri,t+1). Case 14: as Case 13, but with diﬀerent β’s. Case
15: monetary union with equal β’s and perfect return correlations between union
countries, while all other covariances are given by Covt (ri,t+1,r j,t+1)=0 .5∗Vart (ri,t+1),
i 6= j. Case 16: as Case 15, but with diﬀerent β’s.
From Tables 1a and 1b we infer that the move from monetary autonomy to a union
raises the interest rate for both union members. This is the case both when the political
discount rates are equal and when they diﬀer. We also see that in many instances an
increase in one country’s discount rate raises the interest rate not only for this country,
but also for the other country in the union. Finally, we observe that the relative debt
ratio B2,t/B1,t is larger under a union than under no union. However, we also see that
in all instances, the diﬀerences between the union and no union cases are small. Obvi-
ously, this is due to the rather strong convexity introduced by the quadratic terms in
the government’s objective function. We conjecture that introducing milder convexity
into the government’s objective function would lead to numerically stronger eﬀects on the
outcomes, while preserving their qualitative features, however.
6C o n c l u s i o n
While the eﬀects of monetary uniﬁcation on real interest rates and (relative) public debt
accumulation have to a large extent been ignored in the literature, in the preceding analysis
20we have demonstrated that this may be unjustiﬁed. The implications of uniﬁcation for
the real interest rate become important when the risk-return characteristics of the public
debt diﬀer across countries. Monetary uniﬁcation increases the substitutability of the
public debt. As a result, our model predicts a rise in expected debt-servicing costs.
In addition, the share of the union debt issued by relatively undisciplined governments
increases. Similarly, the share of the union debt issued by a country initially characterized
by a relatively dependent central bank rises. These eﬀects of monetary uniﬁcation on the
spread of the relative debt levels may be a source of political tension and provide some
governments with an incentive to put pressure on other governments to reduce their debt.
This, in turn, may weaken the political sustainability of a monetary union. We have also
explored the introduction of a transfer scheme that punishes increases of the national debt
beyond the average debt level in the union. Such a scheme can indeed reduce the average
expected real debt return to the pre-uniﬁcation level. However, it further magniﬁes the
spread in relative debt levels.
While the purpose of this paper was to analyze in a simple framework some potential
consequences of monetary uniﬁcation for (relative) public debt and its required return,
a number of extensions might be worthwhile to pursue. A fully-ﬂe d g e da n a l y s i so ft h e
implications of monetary uniﬁcation for debt-servicing costs should also take into account
how uniﬁcation aﬀects the liquidity of the public debt of individual countries. In particular,
due to the reduction of formal and informal barriers to cross-border ﬁnancial transactions,
the size of the market for its public debt may expand when a country becomes part of a
monetary union. This makes it easier for investors to adjust their public debt holdings.
Hence, potential liquidity premia will shrink. Another extension allows for diﬀerences
in inﬂation rates also after monetary uniﬁcation. Even though uniﬁcation is likely to
increase the correlation of national inﬂation rates and thus of real debt returns, (short-run)
diﬀerences in national inﬂation rates can persist for several reasons, such as cross-country
diﬀerences in consumption bundles or the presence of non-tradables. While our results
are unlikely to be qualitatively aﬀected, such complications will surely have quantitative
implications for the change in borrowing costs and relative debt levels after uniﬁcation.
A third extension is to enrich the stochastic structure of the model by introducing (time-
varying) default risk. Even though default on public debt of EMU members seems a
remote possibility at present, in the longer run it may not be excluded, especially if
governments respond to increasing costs of population aging by issuing more debt. The
crucial question is how monetary uniﬁcation aﬀects the correlation of default risks and
thus the risk premium in the required debt returns. A ﬁnal avenue for further work is
to endogenize the diﬀerences in governments’ myopia by explicitly taking into account
political factors such as the degree of polarization and government turnover rate. This
would link diﬀerences in relative debt and cross-border interest rate externalities to the
political processes in the union members.12
12For an analysis of the political economy of public debt, see Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Drazen
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24Appendix:
A Quadratic government objective function
A.1 Derivation of the system (40), (15), (41) and (42)














Using that Et [(1 + ri,t+1)2]=( 1+re








i,t+1)+Bi,tVart (ri,t+1)+(1 + βi)[Bi,t − Gi,t − Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t)] =
Under the assumption that the economy is in its long run equilibrium where shocks
(by coincidence) happen to be absent and public debt remains constant over time, we can
replace Bi,t−1(1 + ri,t) with Bi,t(1 + re










b ≡ (1 + βi)Bi,t − B
2
i,tµtVart (ri,t+1).
We combine (43) with (15). This yields N equations that can be solved for (B1,t,..,B N,t).
We need to do this numerically It then turns out that the smallest solution for re
i,t+1 is







b2 − 4Bi,t [Bi,tVart (ri,t+1)+( 1+βi)(Bi,t − Gi,t)]
2Bi,t
.
Before we can compute the equilibrium values for the interest rates and the debt levels,
we need to solve for the equilibrium consumption level, so that we can uncover µt in (15).


































































































Further, we have that:
C1,t = NY − Tt − St







where St is world aggregate savings. Further, from the Euler equations, we obtain
C1,t =EtC2,t+1. Combining this, the preceding two expressions and the (rewritten) world
government budget equation:
Tt = Gt +
N X
j=1




we derive the following system in (C1,t,I t), which is conditional on the debt positions and












C1,t = NY − Gt −
N X
j=1
Bj,t−1 (1 + rj,t) − It.
As a ﬁnal step, using that the economies are in a steady state with no shocks, we can
substitute
PN







,a n dw ee n du pw i t ht h es y s t e m
(41) and (42).
A.2 Derivation of the variance of the 30-year return




(1 + rt) − 1.












































E(1 + rt) − 1
#2
.
For Table 1a, we assume that rt =0with probability 1/2 and rt =0 .04 with probability
1/2, implying a variance of rt of (0.02)










Hence, Var(z)=0 .0380649, which is roughly 100 times the variance at the yearly level.
F o rT a b l e1 b ,w ea s s u m et h a trt =0with probability 1/2 and rt =0 .08 with probability
1/2,i m p l y i n gav a r i a n c eo frt of (0.04)
2 and a standard deviation of rt of 4%.E (z2)=
(1.0832)
30−2∗(1.04)







5.0328436.H e n c e , V a r (z)=0 .4769564, which is roughly 300 times the variance at the
yearly level.
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